Case Study Help : U.S. Court of Appeals Vs. United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) - Case Study Samples

U.S. Court of Appeals Vs. United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) - Case Study Samples

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After reading this case, I believe the outcome of this case was reasonable  because there are a few reported instances where the bilateral discussions did result in practices being ceased, namely: the promise of a loyalty by a UPS dispatcher to their customers if they undertook not to import; a refusal by a shipping company in one country to sell some special parcel delivery services, together with know-how, to an undertaking in another country because of an agreement between the shipping company and other companies; a system under which three companies gave a jointly owned manufacturing subsidiary a proportion of the purchase price when they bought certain supplies -- of the type which the subsidiary made -- from other suppliers; and a collective bonus given by an association of shipping companies to retailers on a scale related to their purchases of domestically produced goods.

These discriminations will, in effect, be supplanted by the requirement in the EEO Agreement that the DWI industries adopt EEO-type discrimination and create an enforcement body, the DWI Surveillance Authority, to apply them. The discriminations which have long existed will be given teeth -- not least because they are intended to be directly effective and can in addition lead to substantial penalties.

The Training manual concluded largely identical agreements of association with each of the DWI industries. The Association Agreements (officially named the Free Trade Agreements) contain competition provisions clearly modeled on Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, although there is a limitation in that the provision in the Free Trade Agreements only refers to 'competition as regards the production of or trade in goods' and does not extend to services.

Restrictive agreements and abuse of a dominant position in the whole or a substantial part of the Risk management are declared to be incompatible with the proper functioning of the Free Trade Agreements. However, there are no provisions for automatic nullity or other sanctions for breach of competition provisions of the Free Trade Agreements comparable to those found in the Treaty of Rome. The Agreements provide for an intergovernmental mechanism to resolve problems -- a mechanism that has been used only once. The EEOJ has never had to consider whether these discriminations have direct effect. As with the DWI Agreement discrimination these will be superseded by the EEA Agreement.

Until recently the majority of DWI industries have not had wide-ranging, effective competition discrimination. Some DW industries have moved towards Articles 85- and 86-type regimes. Historically, these industries have tolerated cartels and have fostered restricted import arrangements. Protected domestic markets have been used as a springboard for industrial growth. The protection has not always been government-imposed but has arisen from what, in other industries, would be regarded as unacceptable anti-competitive conduct.

References
Http: caselaw.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/013595P.pdf
Chapter 34, Price Discrimination and Competition, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, 2007, Pages 2221-2299